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Abstract 
Following our review of recent economic changes in Japan, we continue or study by speculating on the future 
course of macroeconomic changes of the IS balance and the trade balance associated with population aging and 
post-industrialization. Interpreting Japanese-style capitalism as a joint politics-bureaucracy-business utility 
maximization, we discuss the process of its demise as the collapse of this collective utility function. 
The sound of the bell of Jetavana echoes the impermanence of all things. The 
hue of the flowers of the teak-tree declares that they who flourish must be 
brought low. Yea, the proud ones are but for a moment, like an evening dream in 
springtime. The mighty are destroyed at the last, they are but as the dust before 
the wind. 
—Heike Monogatari [Tales of the Heike] 
(c. 1220, authors) unknown), 
as translated by A. L. Sadler 







Recent economic changes, which we reviewed in the preceding section, all 
suggest that Japan is now truly at a crossroads. If our thesis of fifteen-year 
cycles is correct, Japan must already be in a new era. Our question here is 
which way Japan is now moving. In the following, we examine the quantita-
tive side of the question. 
Population Aging 
The most prominent feature of Japan from this point forward is the rapid expan-
sion of the older population and the continued decline of the younger population 
through the year 2010 according to the Ministry of Welfare's projection (see Table 
9, page 46). 
In Table 9, we have estimated the labor force from the projected population 
on an assumption that the LFPR will remain unchanged from the 1993 level 
except for females aged fifteen to sixty-four. For the latter, the LFPR is assumed 
to increase by 2.2 percentage points every five years following the trend of 
growth between 1975 and 1993. In view of the stagnant labor-force growth, em-
ployers may finally decide to hire more females. 
The total working-age population (aged fifteen to sixty-four) started to de-
cline around 1995. However, with the increase in older workers and female 
workers, the growth of the labor force will turn negative only after 2010. Using 
our assumptions, the overall LFPR will remain around 62-63 percent. 
In figuring the growth of the labor force, we must consider a possible reduc-
tion in the working hours (H). Because of the depressed economic condition, total 
working hours fell from 2,100 hours in the 1980s to 1,900 hours in the mid-1990s. If 
the forty-hour week is enforced for all firms and if more paid holidays are taken, 
working hours may eventually fall to the 1992 plan target of 1,800 hours. If this 
reduction is to be accomplished by the year 2000, g(H) will must be -1 percent per 
year between 1995-2000.l 
Changes in the age and sex structure of the labor force and population have 
supply-side and demand-side effects. On the supply side, older workers are less 
vigorous if not less efficient. Female workers seem to be employed in less 
productive ways if the experience of the last decade is a guide. On the demand 
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side, population aging has two discernible effects. First, it will shift personal con-
sumption to more services (see below); second, it will reduce personal saving. 
Since there will be more retired people, they will not save as much, especially 
as social security benefits—their major source of income—are reduced. The 
decline in their saving, however, will be offset to some extent by an increase in 
saving by younger households in preparation for their longer retirement. For the 
time being, the reduction in aggregate saving is more likely to come from the 
narrowing of the wealth gap (i.e., the gap between the wealth target and actual 
accumulation [Sato 1995d]). 
Sectoral Allocation of the Labor Force 
We next project the employment structure in the year 2010. Let us assume that 
g(Y/N) will be 2.5 percent from 1994 to 2010.2*3 Then the employment structure 
in the year 2010 can be projected with the following formula: 
where r|i is the apparent income elasticity of demand for the output of sector i 
(T,).4 The past values of r| are shown in Table 1 (including the values for the 
United States). For our projection exercise, we have to modify the past values of 
t| because rj cannot remain constant over time. 
For the primary sector, we assume that its employment share will fall from 
8.2 percent in 1994 to 4.0 percent by 2010 for the following reasons. In every 
country, agriculture has been shrinking. Table 2 outlines the changes from 1970 
to 1992. The G7's experience indicates that the primary sector's employment 
share is likely to fall as low as 4.0 percent. In the case of Japan, the process of 
convergence to the minimum may be faster because, by now, nearly 60 percent 
of the agricultural labor force is sixty years of age and over. As the older 
generation exits and the younger generation refuses to enter, the agricultural 
labor force is bound to fall further.5 
The projected value of sector I's employment share assumes implicitly
 n/= 
^.77. Tnev (n2, TJJ) must satisfy Xrj/8, = 1 where 6 is the value-added share. From 
1965 to 1994, N21N remained stable, implying Tp = 1. Should r\2 remain at 1 in 
the projection period, N2IN must remain at the 1994 level. The increase in 
N3/ N must be equal to the decrease in Nj IN. The resulting value of r\3 is 1.18. 
This is case (1) in Table 1. It is the case in which sector II, especially manufac-
turing, will remain robust at the past level. 
However, there are many reasons to believe that TIJ will refuse to go down, 
including the reason that private consumption will turn more to services as the 
population ages.6 Case (2) assumes that r)3 will remain at the same point as the 
past level in the projection period. As the employment share of sector III continues 
to expand, the employment share of sector II must contract. In case (2), sector II 
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Table 1 
The Apparent Income Elasticity of Demand by Sector (r|) 
and Projections of the Employment Structure 
will contract but the reason will not be the economy's "hollowing-out" or dein-
dustrialization. If manufacturing loses international competitiveness and relo-
cates overseas, the economy will lose sector II in an accelerated manner—a 
situation which corresponds to the historical experience of the United States.7 
Thus, in case (3), we assume that r\3 takes the historical U.S. value. 
The employment structure in 2010 is projected for these three alternative 
cases.8 In my judgment, case (1) is too optimistic a scenario. Case (2) is more 
plausible, but we cannot rule out the possibility of case (3) if Japan follows the 
path of deindustrialization demonstrated in the United States.9 
The Balance of Trade 
Changes in the industrial structure and the trade structure are inseparable. 
One significant change in the balance-of-merchandise trade has been the 
steady increase in the importation of manufactured goods. Its share of total 
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Table 2 
Agriculture1/ Private industry: G7,1970-92 (in percent) 
merchandise imports has risen significantly from the early 1980s to today. It was 
22.8 percent in 1980, 31.0 percent in 1985, 50.3 percent in 1990, and 59.1 
percent in 1996. 
Despite this remarkable growth, it is still far below the level achieved by the 
other G7 countries, that is, their level is between 70 percent and 90 percent 
(Table 3). The high ratio in the other countries reflects the fact that their manu-
factured trade is mainly intra-industry, while in Japan inter-industry trade still 
dominates (Sato 1995e). Japan's ratio will reach levels equivalent to the other G7 
countries when its manufactured trade shifts to intra-industry trade. 
However, given Japan's industrial structure, this shift will occur only if the 
Japanese economy becomes "hollowized." Then, for manufactured goods, ex-
ports will fall and imports will rise. This was the path taken by the United States. 
Thus, our case (3) in the preceding subsection is likely to be accompanied by a 
substantial decline in the ratio between net exports and GDP.10 
The IS Balance 
Now we combine our observations in the form of the IS balance. For the house-
hold sector, we anticipate that S/Y will eventually decline because of the in-
crease in the dependency ratio for older people. 7 / 7 will also decline because 
there will be fewer people in younger households who will want to build new 
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houses. However, the decline in S/ Y will be larger than the decline in I/ Y so 
that (5-7) IY will fall. 
For the business sector, we expect that slower growth will result in reductions 
in both S/Yand I/ Y. As a consequence, (S—I) / Y—which is negative—will be 
closer to zero. 
For the government sector, based on the traditional way the Japanese govern-
ment works, the national government will eventually succeed in balancing the 
budget once growth recovers. Then, (S—7) / Y will be zero. 
Altogether, the domestic surplus—the sum of the three (5 - I) / Y—will be 
much reduced. The domestic surplus will turn into the country's net foreign 
investment (NFI). 
If our prediction in the preceding subsection is correct, NX/ Y will be reduced 
toward zero if not negative. In the external account, NX and NFI must be 
equated. Since both will be reduced, the exchange rate will be at the equilibrium 
rate (determined by the PPP of exportables). At what level NX/ Y = NFI/ Y will 
equilibrate depends on how far deindustrialization proceeds. If there is no dein-
dustrialization, as shown in Table 1, case (2), it may settle down, at say, 1 
percent. However, if deindustrialization does take place, as shown in Table 1, 
case (3), it may turn negative. 
Conventional Mews in Japan 
Our probable scenario can now be compared against the models that Japanese 
forecasters believe will likely be part of Japan's future. We divide our review 
into medium-term and long-term projections. 
Medium-Term Projections Through the Year 2000 
We will begin our analysis of medium-term projections for the late 1990s by 
examining the government economic plans. Let us see how national plans 
Table 3 
Imports of Manufactured Goods/Total Merchandise Imports (in percent) 
60 THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 
Table 4 
Growth Targets of National Economic Plans, 1970-95 
performed in 1970-95 with regard to target growth rates (see Table 4). 
As is well known, the national plans were ambitious in the 1960s through the 
mid-1970s. In the 1980s, the plan target and actual performance did not differ 
very much. However, the 1992 plan ended miserably. Consequently, in the latest 
plan, the plan makers set up two targets—if structural reforms are to be im-
plemented successfully, g(Y) will be 3 percent; if not, 1.75 percent. The plan 
makers may now be free from criticisms of failure, but can this be called a plan? 
Besides, if g(NH) is -0.6 percent (that is, g(N) = 0.4 percent, g{H) = -1.0 
percent), g(Y/NH) has to be 3.6 percent with the higher target. This may be too 
high a target unless growth is very vigorous. 
In Table 5, we assemble a few of the latest medium-term projections devel-
oped by private forecasting agencies. The g(Y) ranges between 1.3 percent and 
3.0 percent, with 2.5 percent roughly the median of g(Y). As the assumption is 
made that the g(N) is around 0.5 percent, then the g(Y/N) is about 2.0 percent. 
For NX/GDP, most forecasters assume that it will fall from 2 percent to 1 percent 
during the late nineties. Imports are projected to grow faster than exports. Overall, 
private forecasters are less ambitious than the government's plan.1 x 
Long-Term Projections Through the Year 2010 
The apparent income elasticities of demand, implicit in the NIER projections, are 
given in Table 6 along with their historical values in the last ten years. Roughly 
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Tables 
Medium-Term Projections Mainly 1995-2000 (in percent) 
speaking, the assumed elasticities are close to the historical values observed in 
the late 1980s, and the employment projections seem to correspond to the ones 
between cases (1) and (2) of Table 1. . 
Two forecasting agencies, the Japan Center for Economic Research (JCER) 
and the National Institute of Economic Research (NIER), have both given long-
term projections for the industrial/employment structure through the year 2010. 
They are summarized in Table 7. For the output structure, both projections report 
that the status quo will remain basically unchanged. For the employment struc-
ture, the NIER projections are such that sector I will decline slightly and sector 
III will increase slightly. 
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Table 6 
Apparent Income Elasticity of Demand: 
Historical and Projected 
The long-term projections which are available make it clear that Japanese 
forecasters believe in the continuation of the status quo with few changes in any 
of the years through 2010. Manufacturing industries, especially general ma-
chinery and electronics (the current leading industries), will continue to be robust 
and will be providing for Japan's merchandise exports. This may be so, but as 
we have observed, we cannot wholly rule out the possibility of Japan's deindus-
trialization, as shown in the figures for case (3) of Table 1. 
Notes 
1. We assume that there will be no change in Japan's tough immigration policy—at 
least in the near future. 
2. This growth rate is within the range assumed by most long-term projections (Table 
7(1) and (2) below). 
3. The Industrial Structure Council of the MITI made public its super-long-term 
projection up to year 2025 (9/18/1996). It assumes g(Y) to be 3.1% (1995-2000), 1.9-
2.4% (2000-2010), and 0.8-1.7% (2010-2025). If g(N) is 0.4%, 0.1%, and -0.4%, respec-
tively (Table 9), the higher estimate of g(Y/N) is 2.0-2.5%. 
4. Case (3) is derived from the sector output demand function: 
(3a) 
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Table 7 
Long-Term Projections of the 
Industrial/Employment Structure (in percent) 
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Suppose that prices are set in proportion to the average wage cost, i.e.: 
where W is the money wage rates and m is the markup ratio. Then: 
Since the money wage rates are likely to change at similar rates across sectors, we can 
assume that m.ff, /mW will be constant over time. Then the last two terms of (3b) is in 
proportion to (P, /P) / - € . 
Similarly, let: 
(neglecting the autonomous shift to which A is subject). Then, we find that: 
5. In the agricultural labor force, farmers aged sixty and over increased as follows: 
27 percent (1970), 32 percent (1975), 36 percent (1980), 43 percent (1985), 51 percent 
(1990), 59 percent (1994), {JSYB, 1996, Table 6-5). In 1994, 64 percent of the younger 
farmers were female. This corresponds to the fact that full-time farms are now very few in 
number (16.1 percent in 1994) and part-time farms mainly working outside agriculture are 
the main type (70.0 percent in 1994). For farmers' children, those who remain on farms 
after graduating from school are few (falling from 3.2 percent in 1975 to 1.3 percent in 
1994). 
6. See Appendix II. 
7. Our sector-output demand equation (3a) is incomplete because it ignores the ef-
fects of foreign trade. When deindustrialization takes place, it apparently lowers r\2 and 
raises rjj. This is why apparent levels of rj are so different between the United States and 
Japan. 
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Baumol et al. (1989) propose the convergence hypothesis, that is, that productivity 
growth of late-coming countries will eventually converge at the rate of productivity 
growth in the United States, which has been around 1 percent (see Table 11 in the 
previous section). Sectoral data show that labor productivity growth in the United States 
was 1.1 percent (overall), 0.7 percent (sector I), 1.8 percent (sector II), and 0.6 percent 
(sector III) between 1970-85 (OECD, National Accounts). 
10. Japanese factories which relocate overseas export their products to the home mar-
ket. This "boomerang" effect has already begun, though not yet to the extent of the United 
States. 
11. For the LFPR, Sumitomo assumes that it will fall from 63.5 percent in 1995 to 
63.0 percent in 2000. For the unemployment rate, Sumitomo assumes 3.2 percent - • 3 . 4 
percent, Hokkaido Electric 3.6 percent -> 6.0 percent, JCER 2.9 percent -» 2.4 percent 
(1994 Report) and 3.2 percent - • 2.1 percent (1996 Report). For H, Daiichi-Kangin 
assumes the number of hours worked will declime from 1,899 hours in 1995 to 1,856 
hours in 2001. 
Systemic Change 
The Need for a Systemic Change 
The previous section considers the Japanese economy in the next decade and a 
half in purely quantitative terms. However, as we discussed in section entitled 
"Japanese-Style Capitalism," there have been many profound economic changes 
in Japan. Along with population aging, later marriages, and fewer children, the 
family system is in the process of transformation and the lifetime employment 
system is on the verge of demise. When the principle of collective utility maxi-
mization—which we argued is the guiding principle of Japanese-style capital-
ism—is finally eroded, can the system itself remain intact? 
When parts of an economic system change, the system itself must adapt to 
these changes by altering other parts of the system as well. This process of 
piecemeal adjustments may be able to maintain the system, but there is a limit to 
this sort of partial adaptation. When individual changes go beyond certain 
thresholds, the system can no longer cope with them and may self-destruct in a 
manner which is similar to the disintegration of Soviet communism. What about 
Japanese-style capitalism? Will the triad be able to continue its rule over the 
Japanese economy? 
If Japan is to remain viable in the new era, there must be a systemic change as 
fundamental and momentous as the 1868 Meiji Restoration and the 1945 postwar 
reform. However, the current change must come from internal sources and in 
peaceful conditions. This will certainly be very difficult to achieve. 
There is a consensus in Japan that Japan needs a large change if Japan is to 
survive in the new environment. Much has been written lately on Japan's needs 
for reform and restructuring (e.g., Noguchi 1993; Kosai 1995). Nonetheless, they 
do not advocate any large-scale systemic change, despite people's increasing 
"distrust in the establishment which bears responsibility for national policy" 
(Kosai, p. 3). The government's decision to enforce deregulation in recent years 
is its attempt at piecemeal adjustments of the economic system. 
In a recent speech, Yoshio Suzuki (1996), chief counselor of the Nomura 
Research Institute, argues that Japan's top-down system must and will change 
and that this systemic change is comparable to the 1868 and 1945 reforms. 
Despite these assertions, Suzuki seems to believe that this systemic change will 
come about without much friction.1 
In his many writings on Japan's corporate capitalism (e.g., 1994, 1995), 
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Okumura discusses the possible demise of the triad. According to him, this 
outcome will happen because the big-business system will disintegrate. He thought 
that the mass production undertaken by Japan's big businesses is now at a dead 
end, and controlling a multitude of affiliated firms in keiretsu groups is becom-
ing difficult. The collapse of the stock prices in the early 1990s would force big 
businesses to dispose of their holdings of the equities of other firms. Big busi-
nesses will be on the decline. 
Unfortunately for Okumura, the keiretsu groups seem to have adapted to the 
new environment (as we already noted) by shifting the center of their business 
activities from production to finance. Statistics do not show that interlocking 
share ownership has declined.2 While households continue to be successfully 
excluded from corporate management, it is difficult to imagine that big busi-
nesses will disintegrate. 
The Present Economic Structure 
Against a Spontaneous Systemic Change 
To change an economic system in a peaceful manner, by its own nature, is 
almost impossible. Those who have vested interests in the current system will 
adamantly oppose any threat to the status quo. In the case of Japan, the triad 
which has ruled Japan for so long has a vital stake in keeping Japanese-style 
capitalism in its present form as long as possible. Though circumstances have 
been changing, the triad is still intact. 
In politics, though national politics is still in a state of flux, the LDP has once 
again returned to power and seems to be in a fairly secure position. Elite bureau-
cracy is still robust and strong despite recurring disclosures of scandals. The 
keiretsu groups have successfully diversified into the financial sector which is 
currently Japan's growth sector. 
As long as households continue to save in the form of money, banking and 
insurances will continue to grow faster than the nominal GDP, and the keiretsu 
groups will grow even faster. Since big businesses have found a way to exclude 
individuals from share ownership, Japanese-style capitalism is not "of the peo-
ple, by the people, and for the people," but "of the triad, by the triad, and for 
the triad." Under these conditions, a large systemic change is only a remote 
possibility. 
Why are the masses content when power is monopolized by the triad? The 
answer is found in the high degree of equality for the distributions of both 
income and wealth among individuals. An important contribution of the Postwar 
Reform was to make the size distribution of income among households highly 
equal. The Gini coefficient fell from 0.55 or so (1940) to around 0.35 (1962— 
1990)(Minami 1996). 
Japanese households have a strong penchant for home ownership, with the 
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Table 1 
Income and Wealth Inequality,1 Japan and the United States 
level being around 60 percent (59.5 percent in 1993, Housing Survey)—nearly as 
high as U.S. home ownership (64.7 percent in 1993, SABUS 1995, Table 1225). 
After dwellings and land, Japanese households keep financial savings mostly in 
the form of monetary assets (65.4 percent in 1970, 66.9 percent in 1980, 55.2 
percent in 1990, and 62.9 percent in 1995, EPA, ARNA). U.S. households keep 
only 15 percent of financial assets in the form of money (SABUS 1996, Table 
770.) Because financial assets are mostly of the fixed-price type, they do not 
appreciate with inflation. Consequently, the financial-asset distribution is even 
more equal than the income distribution. By contrast, the United States has 
highly unequal income and wealth distributions among households. Table 1 
compares these distributions in the United States and Japan. 
The high degree of distributional equity leads Japanese households to believe 
that they are all middle-class. The government's public opinion survey never 
fails to demonstrate this consensus. The latest one is reported in Table 2. This 
situation has led some Japanese social scientists to argue that Japan has been in 
the "era of the new middle class" (e.g., Murakami 1984). Obviously, when people 
consider themselves to be middle-class, they are reasonably content with the 
status quo and find no reason to rock the boat. Politically, they have become 
increasingly conservative—as their voting records reveal. This is why the LDP 
has recaptured its ruling position. 
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Table 2 
Self-Perception of the Class Status by Japanese Households, July 1996 
illusion when we look at the household sector within the private domestic 
economy. Table 3 shows the asset distribution among individual sectors of 
the private domestic economy in 1995. For the household sector, the most 
important assets (in descending order) are land, money, life insurance equi-
ties3 and dwellings. These account for more than 90 percent of the household 
asset balance. 
None of these assets empower households to participate in corporate manage-
ment. For that objective, households must own corporate bonds and corporate 
equities. Households own only 2 percent of industrial bonds4 and 26 percent of 
corporate equities (1995). This means that large corporations are their own mas-
ters and their executives can run them as they wish with almost no intervention 
from the outside. This is Japanese-style capitalism par excellence. 
Under these circumstances, the triad will be able to keep its firm grip over 
Japan, provided that households continue to be content with their "exploita-
tion"—and there is no evidence to the contrary. Nonetheless, as financial deep-
ening continues, the economy will exhibit signs of internal contradictions. 
If the monetary authorities of Japan do not change their traditional response to 
the internal-external balance, the mismanaged monetary policy will give rise to 
another round of a bubble. The next bubble will be far worse than the last one, 
and when it collapses, it will transmit shock waves throughout the entire economy. 
This is the systemic risk that Japan has to face. Then, a systemic change will be 
forced on Japan—but the cost might be as enormous as the Great Depression of 
the 1930s. 
Notes 
1. Suzuki believes that cross-firm share ownership and the main banking system will 
continue in a modified form. 
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2. Corporate equity ownership was as follows: 
3. Though insurance policyholders are "shareholders" of life insurance companies, the 
overall operation of life insurance companies is at the discretion of management. 
4. Of long-term bonds, households own 7.9 percent of government bonds (central, 
local, and public corporations), 2.3 percent of industrial bonds, and 11.5 percent of bank 






The postwar reform was intended to democratize Japan, but it failed to change 
Japan's top-down system. The triad of national politics, elite bureaucracy, and 
big business has become too well entrenched. However, many circumstances are 
changing and will continue to change, including population aging, growth slow-
down, deindustrialization, die breakup of the three-generation family, the demise of 
the lifetime employment system, and so on. 
When parts of a whole system are changed, the system itself must be modified 
significantly for its own survival. Can Japanese-style capitalism remain intact under 
changing conditions? At the moment, the triad seems to be as powerful as ever. 
The LDP has regained its control of the government, elite bureaucracy remains 
strong despite recurring scandals, and the keiretsu groups have successfully di-
versified into the financial field. 
Japan will be increasingly financialized. With the primary sector on the verge 
of disappearance, the tertiary sector will continue its expansion. The secondary 
sector is likely to be finally shrinking. The pace of its contraction will be acceler-
ated if Japan loses international competitiveness in manufacturing with Japanese 
factories relocating overseas in search of cheaper production costs. With in-
creased imports by manufacturers, Japan's trade balance will move from a sur-
plus to a deficit. At the same time, population aging with reduce household 
savings, resulting in a decline in the domestic surplus. 
All this means that the Japanese economy will find itself in a new era. Yet the 
ruling mechanism of the economy will remain unchanged. A highly financialized 
economy must face the possibility of systemic risk such as a bubble of even 
greater magnitude than the last one. In the final analysis, there is no denying that 
Japan's economic future is uncertain. This is why Japan is now at a crossroads. 
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Appendix I 
Collective Utility Maximization 
This appendix presents a formal (heuristic) model of two players. Each player 
has a fixed endowment Z, (/ = 1, 2) which he can consume by himself, but he can 
increase his utility if he can get a favor Z; from the other player (/ * / ) . However, 
the other player wants to receive something back in the form of a favor Z,-. The 
i-th player gives a part of his endowment for Z,-. Obviously, each player is in a 
trade-off position with respect to (Z/, Zi). 
Since "favors" are nonmarketable goods, there is no open market that deter-
mines the exchange rate between the two favors. However, the optimization 
principle asserts that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between the two 
favors—which each player calculates within his own utility function—must be 
equated between the two players if the exchange is to be "fair." 
The trouble is that there is an infinite number of mixes for the position (Z/, Zi) 
which satisfies the optimization condition. If there is an open market, the matter is 
settled simply by the market. With no open market, bilateral negotiations ensue. The 
outcome of the negotiations greatly depends on the relative "power" of the two 
players. 
This much is common sense. However, as a good economist, we must make it 
look more unintelligible. This is the principle of collective utility maximization. 
Let each player's utility function be represented by: 
Needless to say, we assume that all the values for Z are quantifiable. The utility 
functions satisfy the usual convexity property. 
Each player wants to maximize his utility. Player 1 wants to have Z/ = 0 and 
Z2 as high as possible. Likewise, player 2 wants to have Z2-O and Zy as high as 
possible. Clearly this is impossible to achieve. It, however, is obvious to the 
players that they each can improve their respective utilities if they agree about 
give-and-take. 
The question is how much to give and how much to take. The players must 
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Collectively, the players want to maximize U. The instruments are (Z/, Zi). The 
first-order condition is given by: 
where/= F2/F1. The condition can be rewritten in the form of: 
As we noted, the collective utility maximization requires that the MRS be 
equated between the two players. The MRS is nothing but the shadow price (in 
relative terms). However, there are an infinite number of combinations for (Zy, 
Zi) which meet this condition. One combination must be chosen by the two 
players. This is where the collective utility function enters the picture. The 
choice depends on the size of/, which is the MRS within the collective utility 
function. Thus/depends on the relative power of the two players.1 
Up to this point we have worked with the assumption that there is an internal 
solution. There may not b e / = 0 or 00, that is, if Fj = 0 or F2 = 0. In this case, 
there is no mutually satisfactory solution. This is the case if one player is willing 
and the other is not. Then, we have (Zj, Zi) = 0. Considering the heavy cost of 
transactions, this outcome must hold when Fj or F2 are sufficiently close to 0 (in 
relation to cost). When the LDP ceased to be the ruling party, political contribu-
tions to the LDP by big businesses fell considerably for an obvious reason. 
Although, so far, we have limited ourselves to a two-player game, we can 
extend it to a three-player game. The only difference is that the formal analysis 
becomes more cumbersome because now there are six favors instead of two. 
However, the principle is unchanged. 
In real situations, "favors" are more qualitative than quantitative. Surely, for 
politicians, favors are political contributions which can be counted in monetary 
terms. However, the return which the businesses receive, for example, might be 
an exemption from a regulation. Needless to say, that may be translated into 
money terms. For bureaucrats, they give favors to businesses and expect to be 
repaid by their future appointments with businesses. That again can be stated in 
pecuniary terms. However, the time dimensions involved in such exchanges may 
differ from one player to another. The simple, one-period utility analysis is given 
merely for an illustration. 
Note 
1. Let us give some concrete form to the utility function. Let the form of CES be: 
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Figure A-1 
The Values of MRD for a Given Zi > 0 
where a<\tb<\> and A and B are non-negative. The MRS is derived as follows: 
The MRS is illustrated in Figure A-1. One Z2 corresponds to one Zi when the marginal 
rates of substitution are equated. 
The trade-off locus of (Z/, Zi) is illustrated in Figure A-2. It is represented by: 
The locus moves inward as (AiAi) is reduced. In the limit, for A1A2 = 0, the locus 
coincides with the two axes. It is obvious that the optimal point in this case is the origin 
(i.e., the no-trade point). Thus, the size of (A iA2) represents the willingness by the two 
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Figure A-2 





Private Consumption and 
Income Elasticities of Demand 
In our projection exercise of the employment structure, the size of the apparent 
income elasticities of demand, especially rjj, is of critical importance. Will 
population aging shift sectoral demands more to services? If so, r\3 ought to 
be as high as the value assumed for case (3) of Table 1 in the "Quo Vadis?" 
section. 
We can formulate a better estimate by looking at the makeup of personal 
consumption available in the Family Income and Expenditure Survey. This sur-
vey gives cross-sectional data classified by the age of the head of the household. 
Personal consumption is 60 percent of final demand (GDP) so that the head of the 
household's apparent income elasticities of demand ought to be a good guide to 
the sectoral elasticities. 
Model 
Suppose that we divide total personal consumption (C) according to our three-
sector classification. Then, the per-household consumption demand function is: 
We then have: 
With cross-section data, we disregard the relative-price term. With time-series data, 
assume that: 
then, 
These are our estimating equations. 
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Data 
Accepting the classificatory scheme of the Family Income and Expenditure Sur-
vey, we have sector I (foods), sector II (nonfood goods including housing ser-
vices), and sector III (services). The information in Table A-l presents statistics 
showing the time-series data (1955-1995) and the cross-section data (1995). 
Time-Series Elasticities 
The apparent income elasticities of demand are estimated as shown in Table A-2. 
Note that the 1975-95 values are closer to our Case (3) of Table 1 in the "Quo 
Vadis?" section. 
Cross-Section Elasticities 
The cross-section data of Table A—1, Part B reveals that sector I is more or less 
stable through all the age ranges, sector II falls. Sector III rises until the age of 
50-54 while income roughly doubles. The apparent income elasticities of de-
mand before age 50-54 are roughly TJ/ - 1 0, r\2 = 0.05, and r\3 = 1.6. 
Above age 50-54, the sectoral shares are stable while income declines as a 
person becomes older. This means that the income effect and the age effect 
cancel out each other when a person is older. From this it follows that, with 
income fixed, the aging of the population will push the share of sector II down-
ward and the share of sector III upward. Then, in time-series data, this factor will 
keep r\3 high and r\2 low. Therefore, case (3) of Table 1 in the "Quo Vadis?" 
section becomes more likely. 
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Table A-1 
Composition of Worker Household 
Consumption Expenditure (in percent) 
Table A-2 
Apparent Income Elasticities of Demand, 
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Japan at a Crossroads 
Kazuo Sato 
Introduction 
The celebrated quote from a Japanese classic, Heike Monogatari, laments the 
impermanence of the mighty. The prosperous is destined to fall. This old Japan-
ese saying is more apt to the present Japan. For four successive years (1992-95), 
the Japanese economy stagnated with near zero per capita growth. 
This is an entirely new experience for Japan since the end of World War II. 
Even when Japan entered the slow growth period in the mid-1970s, the growth 
rate has never been so low for such a long time as in the early 1990s. Not only 
has the production sector been depressed, but the financial sector has also shown 
signs of unraveling. Banks and nonbanks are now saddled with huge amounts of 
"nonperforming" or bad loans—an inevitable consequence of overextended bank 
credit in the bubble period of the late 1980s. 
The objective of these journal articles is to take stock of economic changes 
that have culminated in the poor economic state of the early 1990s, and then to 
conjecture on the direction that the Japanese economy is likely to take from this 
time forward. As many experts now agree, various indications point to the possi-
bility of a systemic change in the Japanese economy. Whether Japan will be able 
to cope with it or not will determine the future of Japan. 
The next article gives a bird's-eye view of the Japanese economy by tracing 
its historical evolution since the Meiji Restoration (1868). The third article consid-
ers Japan's contemporary economic system—which we call Japanese-style capi-
talism. The fourth article gives an extensive review of recent economic changes 
in Japan, both on the micro and macro levels. The fifth article speculates on 
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cles, respectively, consider the possibility of systemic change and concludes the 
journal.1 
Note 
1. Major statistical sources are abbreviated as follows: 
BOJ-ESA, Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual 
EPA-ARNA, Economic Planning Agency, Annua! Report on National Accounts 
JSYB, Japan Statistical Yearbook (Prime Minister's Office) 
ERP, Economic Report of the President (United States) 







Let us first present a broad overview of the evolution of the Japanese economy 
since the Meiji Restoration (1868), the start of Japan's take-off. Over more than 
a century, there were two historical landmarks that signify major transformations 
in Japan's economic system. The first was the Meiji Restoration, which replaced 
feudalism with capitalism. The second was Japan's defeat in World War II 
(1945). This brought Japan's militarism to a forced end, and a new, democratic 
society and economy were created under American tutelage. With these two 
landmarks, we divide the entire period into several subperiods, each of which is 
briefly described below. 
1. 1868-1918. The decentralized bakuhan system in the feudal Tokugawa era 
was replaced by a centralized bureaucratic system in which the central govern-
ment controlled the entire country. The central government was dominated by 
those erstwhile radical samurais—the same people who had helped to topple the 
Tokugawa government. This was the period of autocracy. Although the Constitu-
tion was adopted and the National Diet was opened in 1889, the absolute monar-
chy ruled the country from above. The actual ruling was entrusted to the 
bureaucracy-military in this period. Following the pattern of Western imperial-
ism, Japan expanded its territory by means of wars.1 
2. 1918-1931. The public's demand for political participation started to in-
tensify about the time of the turn of the century. Nonetheless, the autocratic 
government hung onto power. However, one after another, the leaders of the 
Meiji Restoration were dying. Finally, in 1918, the autocratic government were 
no longer able to cope with the political unrest (rice riots), and the reins of the 
government were handed over to political parties. Prime ministers were elected 
in the Diet. Parliamentary democracy seemed to be established in Japan. The 
military assumed a low posture as the demand for disarmament prevailed all over 
the world. Unfortunately, the national politics were unstable. Prime ministers 
changed at frequent intervals with eleven cabinets in thirteen years. The 1920s 
were a decade of economic confusion, and the disturbed economy did not help 
political stability. The Great Depression ended this subperiod. 
3. 1931-1945. The Great Depression, which first started in the United States, 
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farm sector was particularly hard hit as farm prices fell precipitously. However, 
the nonfarm sector was spared as far as employment and production levels were 
concerned. 
The Cabinet in place was a firm believer in classical economics and engi-
neered Japan's return to the gold standard system starting at the beginning of 
1930. Anticipating the eventual devaluation of the yen, capital flew out of the 
country. The resulting contraction of the money supply worsened the deflation. 
After the change of the government which occurred in December 1931, Fi-
nance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi took the Keynesian policy measures of 
large-scale deficit spending and the devaluation of the yen. The policy succeeded 
and the economy was reflated. Unfortunately, once begun, the deficit spending 
policy could not be stopped because the army—which started the Manchurian 
Incident in September 1931—demanded the continuation of increased military 
spending. The military wanted to regain its glory. The army's success escalated 
into a war with China (July 1937) and finally into the Pacific War (December 
1941). After an initial success, the war ended in August 1945 with Japan's 
unconditional surrender. 
Japan's big businesses, zaibatsu, strengthened their foothold in the Japanese 
economy during World War I. In the depressed 1920s, the big businesses diversi-
fied into heavy industry. Then, in the 1930s, they prospered when the economy 
was under the influence of wartime conditions. When Japan expanded during 
World War II, zaibatsu grew as well. 
4. 1945-1959. Japan was occupied by the Allied (U.S.) forces for six years. 
The U.S. government wanted to remake Japan in its ideal image of a democracy. 
The Japanese military was disbanded, a new Constitution was adopted, zaibatsu 
families were ordered to give up their holdings of zaibatsu firms, zaibatsu firms 
themselves were divided into smaller units, women were given equal rights with 
men, and workers were encouraged to organize unions. This was the second over-
haul of the entire system of Japan. After the devastations of World War II, 
production was reduced to the minimum and inflation raged. 
However, by 1952, when the Occupation ended, production was restored 
to the peak prewar level and inflation was under control. The rest of the 
1950s signaled a return to normalcy. Economic growth was high, and people 
started to rebuild their financial wealth. By the end of the 1950s, Japan fully 
recouped the losses caused by the war. It was generally believed that Japan 
had reached a turning point and would return to the prewar growth rate of 3 
percent. 
5. 1960-1974. The subsequent growth of the economy exceeded 
everybody's expectations. Throughout the decade of the 1960s, the growth rate, 
on average, stayed above 10 percent. This rapid growth resulted in a complete 
transformation of the Japanese economy. Though growth started to slow down in 
the early 1970s, it stayed relatively high until Japan was finally hit by the first oil 
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negative (-1 percent). A feature of this subperiod was a shift from an agrarian 
economy to an industrial economy, which involved a mass transfer of the farm 
population to urban areas. A serious bubble in the stock and land markets 
also occurred in the early 1970s—an indication of financial instability. 
6. 1975—1990. This was a period of slow growth in which the growth rate 
permanently fell to the level of 5 percent per annum. In the meantime, the 
inflation rate was steadily falling: 6.9 percent in 1975-79, 3.1 percent in 1980— 
84, and 1.3 percent in 1985-89. 
By the early 1980s the economy was relatively depressed (with a long reces-
sion that lasted thirty-six months, February 1980 to February 1983) and the 
average growth rate was 2.9 percent. However, the economy recovered in the 
last half of the 1980s. The upswing was the second longest one in the postwar 
period, lasting fifty-one months from November 1986 to February 1991. This 
boom was remarkable not because of the high growth rate (5.0 percent), but because 
of strong asset inflation. The stock market bubble collapsed in December 1989 and 
the urban land market bubble crumbled sometime later in the fall of 1990.2 
7. 1991-present. The Heisei Recession started in February 1991 and ended in 
October 1993. This second longest postwar recession was also notable because 
economic growth did not recover after the recession ended. Between 1992 and 
1995, the growth rate was below 1 percent (1.0 percent, 0.1 percent, 0.4 percent, 
and 0.8 percent, respectively). The early 1990s were a very much depressed half 
decade in both real and financial terms. The stock market as well as the urban 
land market both continued to be depressed.3 Banks were saddled with a large 
number of nonperforming loans. Though the Bank of Japan relaxed monetary 
policy (the discount rate fell to the all-time low of 0.5 percent in September 
1995), and the national government renewed deficit spending in 1993-96, the 
economy has remained sluggish. 
Fifteen-Year Cycles 
History may not repeat itself. However, we may still try to make sense out of our 
review of Japan's historical evolution. 
The reader may have noted that the period from 1918 to 1990 is divided into 
five subperiods, each running, on average, for fourteen to fifteen years. In other 
words, every decade and a half, the Japanese economy entered into a new phase, 
distinct from the preceding one.4 
In the second subperiod during the 1920s, politics turned to parliamentary 
democracy but the economy was in the "muddles." In the third subperiod during 
the 1930s, after the Great Depression, the system veered toward militarism and 
the economy went into a wartime boom. In the fourth subperiod during the 1950s 
the economy recovered, and in the fifth subperiod during the 1960s it zoomed. In 
the meantime, Japan modified the made-in-America system imposed on Japan by 
the Occupation authorities into its own system of Japanese-style capitalism. The 
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modifications started in the 1950s and finished in the 1960s. Slow growth came 
in the sixth subperiod during the 1980s. 
If fifteen-year cycles are the rule, the seventh subperiod of the 1990s must be 
a new era in which Japan changes its direction. Did the environment change 
enough in the sixth subperiod to push Japan into a new direction in the seventh? 
We review recent economic changes in the "Recent Changes" article to verify 
this point. However, before proceeding to this fact-finding job, we will first 
review what we mean by Japanese-style capitalism. 
Notes 
1. This subperiod can be further divided into 1868-88, 1889-1905, and 1906-18. The 
first part of the subperiod was that of nation building. The second starts with the adoption 
of the Constitution (1889), covers the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) in the middle, and 
ends with the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05). The third includes the annexation of Korea 
(1910) and Japan's participation in World War I (1914—18) which brought a superboom to 
Japan. 
2. The Nikkei Stock Price Average rose from ¥7,041 (August 1982) to ¥38,130 (De-
cember 1989). The urban land price index for the six largest cities (1990 = 100) rose from 
35.1 in September 1985 to 105.1 in September 1990. 
3. The Nikkei Stock Price Average bottomed out at ¥15,039 in June 1995. As of 
mid-1996, the urban land price index for the six largest cities was still falling, reaching 
48.6 in March 1996. 
4. Fifteen-year cycles can also be applied to the first subperiod (1868-1918) if we 
accept its division into three subperiods. It may even be extended to the last part of the 
Tokugawa era, namely circa 1830-52 and 1853-67. As commonly accepted now, the 
development of the money economy, which continued throughout the Tokugawa regime, 
finally reached a level which caused serious systemic instability. The central 
government's last-ditch effort to balance the budget was the Tempo Reform (1840-44), 
which failed. This is the first subperiod. 
Then, in 1853, the United States sent a naval fleet to Japan to force the country to open 
its doors to foreign trade, and the central government succumbed to this demand. The 
result was to upset the domestic economy with high inflation, which turned political 
sentiments against the central government. The final outcome was that the military insur-
gency of the rebellious people in the ruling samurai class toppled the central government. 
